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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL
TERMINATION RULE AFTER
TATE v. BROWNING-FERRIS, INC.
I. INTRODUCrION
Although the scope of available remedies for claims of racially
motivated wrongful discharge has expanded over the years, it contin-
ues to differ somewhat among the states.' Extensive legislation and
case law, both federal and state, addressing the subject of equal rights
in the workplace has added to the variation in remedies available to
the aggrieved employee.' In Oklahoma, there are several available
remedies for a racially discriminatory wrongful discharge claim The
1. Compare Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (Hawaii), 634 F. Supp. 684, 685, 688 (D.
Haw. 1986) (holding that because the public policy claim was created by statute, the statutory
remedies are exclusive); Hamilton v. First Baptist Elderly Hous. Found., 436 N.W.2d 336, 341
(Iowa 1989) (holding civil rights statute preempted all common law actions that were based on
discrimination); with Broomfield v. Lundell, 767 P.2d 697, 703 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (Arizona
Civil Rights Act does not preempt tort claim for wrongful discharge); Goldsborough v. Eagle
Crest Partners, Ltd., 805 P.2d 723, 724-25 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (Oregon statute does not preclude
recovery under tort claim for wrongful discharge).
2. See generally, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-20 to 45-19-46 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993) (Fair
Employment Practices Act does not provide exclusive remedy); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 37.2101-.2804 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act does not provide
exclusive remedy); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to 5-11-19 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (West Virginia
Human Rights Act provides exclusive remedy under certain circumstances); Shanahan v. WITI-
TV, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 219,224 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (common law remedy under public policy excep-
tion to the at-will termination rule allowed only when there is no other adequate remedy avail-
able); Froyd v. Cook, 681 F. Supp. 669, 677 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (California Fair Employment
Housing Act does not displace claim for wrongful discharge).
3. Both statutory and common law remedies exist:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,4 has thor-
oughly examined these remedies and discussed their relationship to
each other. The thrust of the decision is that a discharge in retaliation
for filing a racial discrimination complaint offends public policy,
thereby allowing suit in tort under the public policy exception to the
at-will termination rule in Oklahoma.5 Furthermore, the Court im-
plied that this public policy exception may be expanded to include
other forms of discrimination as well.
This case note will focus upon the Court's recognition of the tort
for racially discriminatory wrongful discharge as a public policy excep-
tion to the at-will termination rule. It will also discuss the implications
of the Tate opinion for employees and employers, the possibility of
further expansion of the exception to include handicap, sexual, and
other forms of discrimination, and how the Model Employment Ter-
mination Act would affect the situation presented in Tate. Finally, this
note will examine the potential problems that may arise from this de-
cision, such as forum shopping for available remedies and preventing
cumulative remedies.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Plaintiff, Walter Tate, a black employee, initially filed a racial dis-
crimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) claiming his employer, defendant Browning-Ferris,
Inc. (BFI), had committed discriminatory employment practices. 6 In
42 U.S.C. § 2-2(a) (1988). The entire 1964 Civil Rights Act can be found at 42 U.S.C. §8 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991). The analogous provisions of the Oklahoma anti-discrimina-
tion act provide:
A. It is a discriminatory practice for an employer.
1. To fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against an individ-
ual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, privileges or responsibilities
of employment, because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap
unless such action is related to a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of the employer's business or enterprise; or
2. To limit, segregate, or classify an employee in a way which would deprive or tend to
deprive an individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the
status of an employee, because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
handicap unless such action is related to a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business or enterprise.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1302 (1991). The entire Oklahoma anti-discrimination act can be found at
OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, §§ 1101-1901 (1991 & Supp. 1992). For a discussion of the public policy
exception to the at-will termination rule, see Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
4. 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992).
5. Id. at 1225.
6. Id. at 1221 n.9.
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retaliation for his EEOC complaint, BFI further discriminated against
Mr. Tate and, ultimately, fired him.7 Mr. Tate filed a second EEOC
complaint for his termination.' When the EEOC failed to settle the
complaints, Mr. Tate filed an action in federal court with a pendent
state law claim. 9 He alleged BFI's conduct violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964.10 He sought various remedies as pro-
vided under the statute.11 He also asserted a public policy tort claim
under Oklahoma law, and sought compensatory and punitive damages
for BFI's "racially discriminatory and retaliatory treatment. 12
B. Procedural History
Mr. Tate's suit was filed in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma. 3 However, prior to handing down
a decision and pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act,'4 the District Court certified a question to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. The Court asked,
Where an at-will employee terminated by a private employer files
suit alleging facts that, if true, violate state and federal statutes pro-
viding remedies for employment discrimination, can the employee-
plaintiff state a tort cause of action based on the same facts, pursu-
ant to the public policy exception to the at-will termination rule,
recently recognized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Burk v. K-
Mart [Corp.], 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989)? 5
The resolution of this question about the public policy exception to
the at-will termination rule is the focus of both the Tate opinion and
this case note.
7. Id. at 1221-22.
8. Id. at 1221.
9. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1221 n.9 (Okla. 1992).
10. Id. at 1222 n.9.
11. Id. Under Title VII, Tate sought reinstatement, including back pay and benefits, to-
gether with all retroactive seniority, promotions and benefits, or alternatively, front pay and
attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, -6, -8, -17. For further discussion on these remedies,
see infra note 39.
12. Tate, 833 P.2d at 1222 n.10. The Court noted that Tate indirectly sought damages for
emotional distress. However, it only addressed the state law claim for the tort of wrongful
discharge.
13. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Okla. 1992).
14. OIUA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 1601-11 (1991).
15. Tate, 833 P.2d at 1220.
19931
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Ill. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A. The Public Policy Exception to the At-will Termination Rule
1. Its Origination in Burk v. K-Mart Corporation
The key to the Court's holding in Tate was its decision to include
racial discrimination as a public policy exception to the at-will termi-
nation rule. Understanding the Court's expansion of this policy in
Tate requires an examination of its origin in Burk v. K-Mart Corp.16
In Burk the Oklahoma Supreme Court first recognized a tort action
under the public policy exception to the at-will termination rule.17
The Court held a tort claim is actionable under this exception when
the employee is "discharged for refusing to act in violation of an es-
tablished and well-defined public policy or for performing an act con-
sistent with a clear and compelling public policy."'18
The Court's adoption of this public policy exception was based
partially upon its decision in Hinson v. Cameron.'9 In Hinson, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed the five "nationally recognized"
areas where an employee's discharge is actionable on public policy
grounds. These areas include an employee's: (1) refusal to participate
in illegal activity, (2) engagement in an important public obligation
such as jury duty, (3) exercise of a legal right or interest, (4) exposure
of wrongdoing by his or her employer, and (5) performance of an act
in accordance with public policy or refusal to act in contravention of
public policy.20 Additionally, the discharge must be shown to be cou-
pled with bad faith, malice or retaliation.2' The Burk Court focused
upon this fifth area when it recognized a tort action under the public
policy exception.
The Tate Court determined the basic theory behind the at-will
doctrine is that either the employer or the employee may terminate
16. 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
17. Id. at 28.
18. Id. at 29. To determine a "clear mandate of public policy," a court must examine rele-
vant constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions, as well as past judicial expressions of
public policy. Id. (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982)).
An employer's attempt to avoid paying an employee wages previously earned violates such pub-
lic policy. Id.
For limitations on the public policy exception, see Pearson v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co.,
820 P.2d 443, 445 (Okla. 1991) (holding that absence of a "clear mandate of public policy" for
basis of wrongful discharge tort in the federal Polygraph Examiners Act prevents plaintiff's
wrongful discharge claim under the Act from prevailing). See also Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,
833 P.2d 1218, 1224-25 nn.23-30 (Okla. 1992)(discussing relevant case law).
19. 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987).
20. Id. at 552-53.
21. Id. at 553.
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the employment at any time without cause.22 Decisions by the Court
prior to Burk reflect a narrow approach to the rights of employees
and agents to maintain their positions against their employers' and
principals' will in at-will termination contracts.3 This narrow ap-
proach was expanded by the theory that when an employer terminates
an at-will employee in contravention of specific public policy, that em-
ployee should be protected.24 By 1989, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
was convinced it should increase the protection of employees' rights in
the at-will termination context by recognizing a public policy excep-
tion to the general rule.'
The Burk Court reinforced its adoption of the public policy ex-
ception by stating that tort claims can arise in the context of employ-
ment contracts. Because an action in tort can originate from contract
performance, damages may be recoverable for the tort despite the fact
that the contract created the parties' relationship.26 An employer's
termination of an at-will employee which clearly violates public policy
is a tortious breach of those contractual obligations.27 The Court
adopted this theory in Burk and expanded it in Tate to include racial
discrimination.
2. Expansion of the Public Policy Exception to Include Racial
Discrimination
The Tate Court's decision to include racial discrimination in the
public policy exception involved extensive analysis of case law of
other jurisdictions. This analysis determined whether, and if so, when
other courts allowed common law actions for discrimination to coexist
with statutory actions. The Court noted that other jurisdictions have
22. Tate, 833 P.2d at 1223-25.
23. Although Burk was the first case to clearly state Oklahoma's adoption of the public
policy exception, earlier case law hints at the Court's recognition of the important role filled by
implied covenants in employment at-will situations. See e.g., Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713
P.2d 1027, 1029-30 (Okla. 1985) (holding that a covenant of good faith not to resort wrongfully
to termination at-will clause was implied in written agency contract); but see Hinson, 742 P.2d at
554 (recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in some jurisdictions
and situations whether or not a formal employment contract exists, but not adopting this cove-
nant in Oklahoma). It should be noted that Burk explicitly held regarding an employment at-
will contract, "there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that governs the em-
ployer's decision to terminate .... " Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 27 (Okla. 1989).
24. Burk, 770 P.2d at 27-28.
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taken one of three positions.m 8 First, anti-discrimination statutes pro-
vide exclusive remedies by preempting all common law actions.2 9 Sec-
ond, when existent, anti-discrimination statutes provide exclusive
remedies, and common law remedies are permitted only when public
policy would otherwise go unvindicated.30 Third, common law reme-
dies supplement statutory remedies and serve to deter "entrenched
existing illegal employment practices. ' 31 The Tate Court adopted the
third theory by declaring that common law public policy remedies
should coexist with statutory remedies unless the state legislature ex-
pressed a clear intention that the statutory remedies be exclusive.32
Furthermore, racial discrimination "clearly contravenes the public
policy" of the Oklahoma anti-discrimination statute.33 The Court rea-
soned that in the absence of "textually demonstrable legislative intent
to make the [statutory] remedies ... exclusive," a plaintiff may still
sue for redress under the public policy exception.34 Based on this rea-
soning, the Court recognized Mr. Tate's common law public policy
claim.35
B. The Court's Decision in Tate
The Tate decision had three major points. First, the Court held
that Title VII of the 1964 CRA does not preempt state law. 6 Second,
the Court held the Oklahoma anti-discrimination act does not provide
an exclusive remedy, rather it coexists with other statutes and avail-
able common law remedies.37 Third, and most importantly, the Court
held that racially motivated wrongful discharges offend public policy,
and therefore are tortious breaches of contractual employment
obligations.3"
28. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1223 n.21 (Okla. 1992).
29. E.g., Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1985).
30. E.g., Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1984). The Crews Court noted
that theoretically, common law remedies should be available "to protect a statutory right when
no other civil remedy is available." Id. at 29.
31. E.g., Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 272 N.W.2d 550 (Mich. 1978) (noting that the
Michigan legislature did not intend for the statutory remedies to be exclusive).
32. Tate, 833 P.2d at 1225-26. Generally, "the common law remains in full force in this
state, unless a statute explicitly provides to the contrary." Id. at 1225.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1230.
35. Id.
36. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Okla. 1992).
37. Id. at 1227-30.
38. Id. at 1225.
[Vol. 29:207
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IV. THE EFFEcr OF TATE ON THE LAW IN OKLAHOMA
A. What Tate Means for Employees
The Tate decision will most certainly have a significant impact
upon future employment discrimination in Oklahoma. Tate has
opened the doors for broader recovery of damages by the aggrieved
employee. Tate allows recovery of damages under federal and state
statutes, as well as the common law. If the employee properly files his
or her federal claims, he or she can potentially recover not only com-
pensatory and punitive damages, but also back pay or front pay, attor-
ney's fees, and equitable relief 3 9 The aggrieved employee also has
available the remedies provided in the Oklahoma anti-discrimination
act. These remedies include attorney's fees, equitable relief, and back
pay.40 Finally, the court's expansion of the public policy exception
provides aggrieved employees with a third available remedy: common
law compensatory and punitive damages. However, Oklahoma law
clearly limits the plaintiff's damages to one complete recovery.41 The
net result of the Tate decision is a wide variety of available remedies in
three different areas of the law.
B. What Tate Means for Employers
The greatest effect of Tate upon Oklahoma employers is that they
are subject to stricter standards of acceptable behavior in order to pre-
vent greater liability for discriminatory practices. Private employers
are now subject to a "legal environment of zero tolerance."'42 This
expanded liability is a result of extensive legislation in the context of
employment discrimination, as well as the expansion of the public pol-
icy exception. Employer's liability for unlawful employment practices
includes, as already stated, the traditional damages available under
the 1964 CRA, as well as compensatory and punitive damages under
supplemental civil rights legislation43 and the public policy exception.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), §8 1981a(b)(1) - (b)(3) (Supp. 1 1991), and § 2000e-5(g).
For a definition of back pay and front pay, see Tate, 833 P.2d at 1221 nn.6-7. Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g), equitable relief may involve enjoining the employer from engaging in unlawful
discriminatory behavior. For further discussion of all these remedies, see John V. Jansonius,
Allocation of Back-Pay Liability for Violation of Employee Rights, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 745 (1983).
40. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1505 (1991).
41. See Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1223 n.15 (Okla. 1992). Courts should
carefully instruct juries about punitive damages to ensure compliance with any statutory
limitations.
42. Lynn Paul Mattson, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Development of State-Based
Wrongful Termination, 63 OKLA. BJ. 3823, 3823 (1992).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) and §§ 1981a(b)(1)-(b)(3) (Supp. 11 1991).
1993]
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The Tate decision should be a clear warning to private employers that
there is little room for questionable behavior towards their employ-
ees, and that any discriminatory practices could result in significant
money judgments against the employer.
C. Further Expansion of the Public Policy Exception to Include
Other Forms of Discrimination
1. Handicap Discrimination
Handicap discrimination by an employer is expressly prohibited
by statute in Oklahoma." The Oklahoma anti-discrimination act pro-
vides redress for those employees discriminated against on the basis of
their handicap.4 5 More importantly, section 1901(a) specifically al-
lows a party dissatisfied with the administrative process to file a pri-
vate action against the employer. 46 Statutory recognition of handicap
discrimination provides the public policy that is effectively an excep-
tion to the at-will termination rule. Nevertheless, inclusion of handi-
cap discrimination in the public policy exception doctrine has not been
clearly indicated yet by the Oklahoma courts. Inclusion into the pub-
lic policy exception is the next step for this form of discrimination in
order to clarify the rights of the handicapped employee. The statutory
recognition of this form of discrimination, as well as the recent inclu-
sion of racial discrimination in the public policy exception, provides a
strong argument that handicap discrimination should be included in
this public policy exception as well.
2. Sexual Discrimination
Based upon the recent expansion of the public policy exception to
include one form of highly prevalent discrimination, victims of sexual
discrimination should expect to see this form of discrimination in-
cluded in the public policy exception as well. 47 Recently, the severity
44. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1302 (1991).
45. See id. §§ 1501-08.
46. Id. § 1901(a). The pertinent part provides:
If a charge for discrimination in employment on the basis of handicap is filed...
and is not resolved to the satisfaction of the charging party ... the charging party may
commence an action for redress against any person who is alleged to have discrmi.
nated against the charging party ....
Id.
47. Throughout this section of the note, the use of the term "sexual discrimination" will
include the concept of sexual harassment.
[Vol. 29:207
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and prevalence of sexual discrimination have been increasingly recog-
nized nationally.4s Sexual discrimination will most likely be included
in the Oklahoma public policy exception because it is prohibited
under the same statute as racial and handicap discrimination4 9 and
because no statutory language declares that the statutory remedies are
exclusive. Additionally, other states have allowed common law ac-
tions based upon sexual discrimination.
Sexual discrimination violates a clear mandate of public policy.
The Tate Court found that the legislature's inclusion of racial discrimi-
nation in the statute amounted to a declaration of public policy.50
Likewise, inclusion of sexual discrimination in this statute is a declara-
tion of Oklahoma's public policy. Thus, the next step is for the courts
to include sexual discrimination in the public policy exception. Fi-
nally, since the Tate Court found that the anti-discrimination statute
does not provide the exclusive remedy for racial discrimination, 51 like-
wise the statute should not be interpreted as providing the exclusive
remedy for sexual discrimination, either.
Case law also favors the expansion of the public policy exception
to include sexual discrimination. Other states have already recog-
nized sexual discrimination as creating a private right of action in tort.
The Oregon Supreme Court has recognized sexual harassment as one
act of sexual discrimination that can result in tortious liability for the
employer.5a The plaintiff in Holien was a female employee who was
48. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Court Tries to Sort Merely Annoying from Clearly Harassing,
THE WASHINGTON POsT, Oct. 14,1993, at A01; Pierre Thomas, FBIAgent Alleges Retaliation for
Senate Testimony, Tam WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 12, 1993, at A17 (noting that female agent had
testified before a Senate committee about sexual harassment in the bureau); Joan Biskupic, At
the Supreme Court, a New Solicitor General Takes a New Stand, THm WASHINGTON POST, Oct.
11, 1993, at A13 (noting that the new solicitor will argue that the 1991 federal anti-discrimination
law should be applied retroactively to conduct occurring before its passage); Joan Biskupic, Wo-
men's Issues Spotlighted by Supreme Court Harassmen Bias Lead List of Cases as Ginsburg
Joins, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 4, 1993, at A01 (reporting that the high court's docket is
dominated by sexual harassment and discrimination suits); Elizabeth Kadetsky, The Million-
Dollar Man, 18 WORKING WOMAN 46 (Oct. 1993) (reporting male worker awarded $1.017 mil-
lion in damages in a sexual harassment suit prosecuted against female supervisor); John Green-
wald, The Board vs. The "Babe", 142 TIME 39 (Aug. 30, 1993) (reporting on the sexual
harassment suit filed by a high-ranking female corporate executive).
49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1302 (1991).
50. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1225 (Okla. 1992).
51. Id. at 1230.
52. Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (Or. 1984) (stating that since
"reinstatement, back pay and injunctions vindicate the rights of the victimized group without
compensating the plaintiff for such personal injuries as anguish, physical symptoms of stress,....
[lI]egal as well as equitable remedies are needed to make the plaintiff whole"). Id at 1303-04.
1993]
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discharged after resisting sexual advances and harassment by her em-
ployer. 3 The Court held that since the Oregon legislature did not
provide an exclusive remedy for discrimination, the Court's recogni-
tion of discriminatory sexual harassment would allow the plaintiff to
pursue her common law claim for wrongful discharge. 4
New Hampshire has also acknowledged common law actions for
wrongful discharge based upon sex. In Chamberlin v. 101 Realty,
Inc.,5 5 the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated New Hampshire law
recognizes, "that a sexually-motivated discharge from employment
may evidence a discriminatory workplace environment, provided the
two are causally connected."56 The Court reiterated that sexual dis-
crimination in the workplace violates New Hampshire public policy,
thereby allowing at-will employees to assert wrongful discharge
claims. 7 However, the Court held that although the plaintiff stated a
cause of action both under Title VII and the New Hampshire wrongful
discharge provisions, she would only be entitled recovery under one.58
Recognition by these and other states that sexual discrimination vio-
lates public policy is further evidence favoring the expansion of
Oklahoma's public policy exception to include sexual discrimination.
3. Other Forms of Discrimination That Could Be Included in
the Public Policy Exception
Not only is there good reason for including handicap and sexual
discrimination in the public policy exception, but there is also oppor-
tunity for the inclusion of other forms of discrimination as well. The
Tate decision expounded that a lack of legislative intent in making
statutory remedies exclusive will allow an employee to pursue com-
mon law remedies under the public policy exception.59 Literally inter-
preted, this statement reveals the Court's willingness to expand
application of the public policy exception to all forms of statutorily
53. Id at 1294.
54. Id at 1300.
55. 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990).
56. Id. at 783.
57. Id. at 786.
58. Id.
59. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1230 (Okla. 1992).
[Vol. 29:207
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prohibited discrimination that are not remedy exclusive. 60 Examina-
tion of other state statutes reveals this approach has been accepted by
other jurisdictions.61
A prime example of this theory is found in California's anti-dis-
crimination statutes. A complaint filed under the California Fair Em-
ployment Housing Act does not automatically "prejudice" a person's
right to pursue private remedies for employment and housing discrim-
ination of all types.62 In Arizona, the statutes regulating discrimina-
tion in the workplace are very similar. These statutes allow an
aggrieved employee to seek common law as well as statutory remedies
against the employer for a wide variety of discriminatory acts.63 These
rights and remedies are set forth clearly in the statutes by the Arizona
legislature, supporting the Tate Court's theory that absent a "textually
demonstrable legislative intent" to prevent exclusive remedies, multi-
ple remedies are merely cumulative.'
A third and final example of this theory in practice is found in
Michigan. The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act prohibits a variety of
discriminatory acts in several settings, specifically allowing private as
well as public actions for remedies.65 The Michigan Supreme Court
has held that according to state discrimination statutes and the state
constitution, it is in the interests of public policy to allow cumulative
remedies.66
The presence of case law interpreting various state anti-discrimi-
nation statutes is a positive sign of support for the Tate Court's theory
of allowing statutory and common law remedies to coexist. Because
of this widespread support, employees in Oklahoma may remain
hopeful that its courts will allow cumulative common law and statu-
tory remedies for all forms of discrimination when there is a lack of
"textually demonstrable legislative intent" to make the statutory rem-
edies exclusive.
60. It can be argued that all forms of discrimination listed in OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1302
(1991), might conceivably be included in the public policy exception because: (1) the statute
clearly declares those forms of discrimination to be against public policy, and (2) the statute does
not provide exclusive remedies.
61. See supra note 1.
62. CAL GoV'T CODE §§ 12964-12984 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); see also CAL- CoNsT. art.
1, § 8.
63. ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1461 to -1481 (West 1992 & Supp. 1992).
64. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1230 (Okla. 1992).
65. Micms CoM. LAWS Ar. §§ 37.2101 - .2804 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
66. Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 189 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1971).
1993]
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D. The Model Employment Termination Act
Examination of currently existing employment law in Oklahoma
would not be complete without an analysis of the potential effect of
the Model Employment Termination Act67 upon situations such as the
one presented in Tate. Though this recent Act has not yet been
adopted in any state, it represents a significant effort to simplify and
unify a procedure of redress for aggrieved employees who have been
wrongfully terminated. Close examination of the Act reveals several
ways that it could affect Tate situations if it is accepted and imple-
mented in Oklahoma.
The Act is designed to operate alongside state and federal dis-
criminatory legislation, and it does not preempt recovery under state
statutes. 68 However, its method of settling an employee's claim filed
with the federal or state commission created to handle this litigation is
quite different. Under the Act, Mr. Tate's federal claim could be sub-
ject to arbitration.69 At the conclusion of the arbitration, the arbitra-
tor would make awards for any termination violating the Act.70 These
damage awards for Mr. Tate could include backpay, lump-sum sever-
ance, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and equitable relief.71 Un-
like the 1991 CRA, the arbitrator cannot award Mr. Tate typical tort
damages, and the damages awarded under this Act would be subject
to reduction for any monetary recovery by him in other forums.72
Another pertinent section of the Act addresses the potential for
common law actions. The Act generally extinguishes all common law
rights,73 but provides for limited exceptions. According to the Com-
ments to sections 2(d) and 2(e), Mr. Tate's common law tort claim
would probably be valid under this Act,74 thus allowing potential re-
covery of extensive damages under tort theory. Finally, it should be
noted that if Mr. Tate was discharged. in retaliation for filing a com-
plaint under this Act, the remedies would be substantial. These dam-
ages include punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees, and the
67. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr, 7A U.L.A. 66 (Supp. 1993) (hereinafter
"Model Act"). Interestingly enough, Chief Justice Marian Opala, author of the Tate opinion,
served on the committee acting for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in preparing this Act.
68. Id. § 2(e).
69. Id. § 6.
70. Id. § 7.
71. Model Act, § 7(b)(1) - (4) and Comment.
72. Id. § 7(d).
73. Id. § 2(c).
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Act provides for a separate civil action to enforce the liability.75 Con-
sequently, if this Act was recognized in Oklahoma at the time Mr.
Tate filed his claims, the potential for greater recovery would have
existed.
E. Potential Problems Arising from Tate
Although the Tate opinion is clearly a formative victory for pri-
vate employees in Oklahoma who suffer racial discrimination in the
workplace, the Court's decision may present some possible problems.
One of these is the potential for an employee to engage in forum
shopping. This shopping could occur when an employee files multiple
related claims in various courts or with different agencies to increase
the chances of complete recovery. For example, Mr. Tate could have
filed a federal claim, a state claim, a common law tort claim, and a
claim under the Model Employment Termination Act, if it was recog-
nized in Oklahoma. Because the burdens of proof would differ
among these claims, Mr. Tate would only continue to pursue those
claims with the greatest likelihood of success and the largest amount
of recovery. However, the administrative and procedural costs of fil-
ing all these claims, as well as the time and expense upon the various
courts and agencies, would place an unnecessary burden upon these
systems if his intentions were not to pursue seriously all his claims.
Consequently, the main justification for courts' dislike of forum shop-
ping is the time and expense involved in pursuing multiple claims.
76
The concern over potential forum shopping is closely related to
the problem of double recovery. Whenever there are cumulative rem-
edies available, there is the chance the plaintiff could be awarded
damages in excess of one complete recovery. This is clearly contrary
to the law in Oklahoma.7 7 The availability of statutory and common
law damages for Mr. Tate greatly increases the potential for double
recovery. However, the Tate Court clearly stated that if multiple rem-
edies could result in excessive damages for a single harm, the trial
courts should be able to establish the necessary devices in each case to
prevent double recovery.78 Thus, although the availability of multiple
75. Id. § 10.
76. See Wikman v. City of Novi, 322 N.W.2d 103, 106, 112 (Mich. 1982) (stating "[t]he
proliferation of ... available remedies created problems of forum shopping...").
77. See Cotner v. Lon Jacobs Grocery Co., 202 P. 997, 1001-02 (Okla. 1921) (stating there
cannot be "two satisfactions of the same debt").
78. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1230 n.67 (Okla. 1992).
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remedies increases both the chance of forum shopping and the poten-
tial for double recovery, the courts must exercise some control to pre-
vent abuse of the system by the plaintiff.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tate decision is another positive step forward by the Court in
providing appropriate remedies for employment discrimination. The
expansion of the public policy exception to include racial discrimina-
tion signifies judicial recognition of the need to ensure the discrimi-
nated employee complete recovery. The Court's decision was a
logical expansion of the public policy exception and was certainly
prompted by similar policies in other jurisdictions. The impact of this
decision allows greater remedies for the employee while at the same
time requiring highly stringent standards of acceptable behavior by
employers. Hopefully, the Court's decision in Tate will soon lead to
the inclusion of handicap, sexual, and other forms of discrimination
within this public policy exception in order to adequately remedy the
vast problems of discrimination in society today. Finally, despite the
potential problems of forum shopping and cumulative remedies, the
Tate decision will certainly have a profound and progressive impact
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